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2001)
A MATTER OF CLASS: THE IMPACT OF BROWN

v.

McLEAN

ON EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASES

I.

INTRODUCTION

"We have seen the enemy and sometimes he or she works [or worked]

for us."1 This may be the attitude that many employers have towards their
former (litigious) employees as current and former employees file an in
creasing number of employment discrimination claims each year.2 Con
gress ori ginally enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'.� (Title
VII) to eliminate discriminatory hiring procedures, which prevented mi
nority workers from enjoying equal employment opportunities.4 Today,
however, the focus of Title VII has shifted from discriminatory hi ring
1. Pamela R. Johnson & Julie Indvik, Rebels, Criticizers, Backstabbers, and Busy
bodies: Anger and Aggression at Work, Pus. PERSONNEL MGMT., June 22, 2000, at 165.
2. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving Beyond
McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination
Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 660 ( 1998) (noting that employment discrimination
suits constitute substantial part of all lawsuits); Johnson & Indvik, supra note 1, at
165 (stating that current or former employees file one out of every five lawsuits
nationwide); United States EEO C, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Chmges i'Y
1992-fY 1999, availab/,e at http://www.eeoc.gov/ stats/vii.html (last m odified Jan.
12, 2000) (noting that approximately 57,600 Title VII charges filed with EEOC in
1999 compared with 55,400 charges filed in 1992).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ( 1995) (noting that it is unlawful for employers
to refuse to hire or discharge employee on basis of employee's protected attrib
utes). The statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-

Id.

( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; .. ..

The legislat ive history of Title VII also indicates that Congress' goal was to
create equal employment opportunities. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26 ( 1963),
reJ!ri �ted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 240 1 (stating that Title VII's purpose is to
ehmmate employment discrimination); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
41 1 U.S. 792, 800 ( 1973) (noting that purpose of Title VII was to create equal
employment opportunities); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I:
The Myth of the Protected Class in Tit/.e VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. R.Ev.
441, 444 ( 1998) (noting Pl;1rpose of Title VII); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Dif
.
t

feren Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the
McD onnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CA.sE W. REs. L. REv. 53, 61 ( 1999)

.
(staung that Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was "the relegation of
Blacks to low-skill jobs").

(421)
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Despite thi s dramatic shift,

the United States Supreme Court has never established the pri ma facie
element s that a p l aintiff allegi ng discriminatory discharge must show.6 A"l
a result, a dispute has arisen among the federal circuit courts over the

relevancy of a plaintiff's replacement identity within the prim a facie frame
work for discrim in ato ry discharge cases. 7
5. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changi.nK Nature of b11f1l<ry
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 S TAN L. REv. 983, 983 ( 1991 ) ( [T] oday the vast
.

"

majority of all litigation suits challenge discrim ination in discharge. Although the
authors and early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them CL')
tools for opening employment opportunities to blacks, women, and other minori
ties, this is no longer their primary use."); see also Kenneth R. Gilberg, FmfJlU)·n�
Must Protect Their Companies Against Empl<ryee Lawsuits, SUPERVISION, Nov. 1, 1992, at
12 (noting increasing numbers of employees file wrongful discharge suit-; against
their former employers).
6. See Elizabeth Clack-Freeman, Comment, Tit/,e VII and Plair1tijj\ Hqlirlrrment:
A Prima Facie Consideration, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 463, 469 ( 1998) (stating that Coun
has never addressed what plaintiffs in discriminatory discharge cases must show so
circuit courts had to define prima facie elements for discharge cases). The Su
preme Court also established the proper order and allocation of proof for discrim
inatory hiring cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 4 I I U.S. at 802-04
(establishing burden-shifting system for employment discrimination cases). For a
further discussion of the burden-shifting system, see infra notes 32-37 and accom
panying text. The first step of the three-step system requires a plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802 (creat
ing four elements of prima facie case). Although all federal courts have adopted
the burden-shifting system and the prima facie case for discriminatory discharge
claims, some courts have m o dified the prima facie elements. See BARBARA LINDE
MANN ScHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN , EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 261-62 (David
A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 1989) (noting that courts
apply burden-shifting system to discriminatory discharge claims but modify ele
ments of prima facie case). In particular, courts tend to change the fourth ele
ment of the prima facie case, in which the Supreme Court required a plaintiff
alleging discriminatory hiring to show that the employer continued to seek appli
cants to fill the plaintiff's position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (requir
ing plaintiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show employer sought replacement);
see also 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CooRDINATOR, 37, at 115 (2000) [hereinaf
ter EMPLOYMENT] (noting courts have developed differing views on fourth
element).

7. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 490 ("Federal circuit courts continue to
wrestle with discharge cases where the plaintiff has been replaced by someone
from within his protected class."). Federal circuit courts have developed varying
views regarding the replacement requirement. Compare Lowry v. Bedford County
Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, al *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (affirming
grant of summary judgment because plaintiff failed lo show non-class replace
ment), with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir.
2000) (requiring plaintiff to show o nly that position was not eliminated after dis
charge). In Kendrick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
�ole � that the Sup�eme Court has yet to a??ress the relevancy of a replacement's
1denl1ty. See Kendnck, 220 F.3d al 1227 (c1tmg St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 528 n.l (1993) (Souter,J., dissenting)); see also Deborah C. Malamud, The
Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2245 (1995)
(stat �ng C:ourt did not �attempt to gi �e any meaningful guidance as to how the
spec1ficat1on of the reqmred pnma fac1e proof would be determined for cases with
other facts").
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Green/'- the United States Supreme Court

established the elements of a prima facie case, which a plaintiff alleging
discriminatory hiring must show.9 In the absence of the Supreme Court's
guidance, however, c ourts have encountered difficulties in applying this
framework to discriminatory discharge claims. 10 For example, in Brown v.
McLean,11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found

that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, plaintiffs
must show that their employers replaced them with individuals from
outside of their protected class ("non-class replacement").12 Other fed
eral courts, however, have expressly rejected this requirement, finding that
this strict approach does not take into account employers who, attempting
to avoid a discrimination suit, replaced the plain tiff with an individual
from within the plaintiffs protected class ("same-class replacement") .13
Several courts also have found that an employer may discharge an em
ployee because the employee does not meet the employer's stereotypical
image of a person from the employee's protected class.14
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. See id. at 802 (stating plaintiff must show four elements to establish prima
fade case) . The Suprem e Court found that a plaintiff must show that he or she is a
member of a protected class; that he or she applied for and was qualified for the
job; that he or she was rejected and the position remained open and that the
employer continued to seek applicants. See id. at 802 (listing elements of prima
facie case of discriminatory h_iring ) . Although the Supreme Court initially stated
the first element as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she is a racial minor
ity, the prima fade case arises regardless of whether or not they are a member of a
traditional minority group. See HENRY H. PERRITT, jR., E MPLOYEE DISMISSAL AND
PRACTICE§ 2.3 (1992) (stating that every person belongs to protected class) .
10. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 261-62 ( noting courts apply vary
ing modifications of prima facie elements ) ; Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stat
ing court did not give guidance for application of framework in other contexts);
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (stating courts apply prima facie elements dif
ferently in discriminatory discharge cases); see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining varying applications of fourth element of
prima facie framework in discriminatory discharge case) ; Pivirotto v. Innovative
Sys., Inc., 191F.3d 344, 354 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting varying interpretations of prima
facie elements in discriminatory discharge cases) .
11. 159 F.3d 898 (4th Cir. 1998) .
12. See id. at 905-06 (holding failure to show non-class replacement precluded
plaintiff from establishing prima fade case) . For a further discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Brown, see infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
13. Su, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating employer may hire same-class
employee to avoid discrimination suit) ; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d
1529, 1535 ( 11th Cir. 1984) (stating that employer may hire same-class replace
ment to evade discrimination suits) ; see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6,, 37, at 115
(noting persuasiveness of argument that employers may hire same class replace
ment to avoid litigation ) .
14. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137 (statin g non-class replacement require
ment would preclude suits against "an employer who terminates a woman it nega
tively perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to be
subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an African-American with an Afri
can-American who is perceived to 'know his place"') ; Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355
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This Note discusses the federal courts' viewpoints on the relevancy of
a plaintiffs replacement identity in establishing prima facie cases of dis
criminatory termination under Title VII.15 Part II of this Note discusses
the United States Supreme Court's development of the prima facie frame
work for discriminatory hiring cases a n d the federal courts' subsequent
adaptation of that framework to discriminatory termination cases. 16 P art

II also examines the varying circuit viewpoints on the relevancy of a plain
tiffs replacement within this frame w ork.17 Part III discusses the relevant
facts of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown v. McLean.18

Part IV ana

lyzes and critiques the Fourth Circuit's improperly reasoned holding in

Brown.19 Finally, Part V addresses the adverse impact of requiring a pl ain 
tiff to prove that his or her replacement came from outside the plaintiffs

protected class. 20

II.

BACKGROUND OF THE TITLE VII PRIMA FACIE CAsE
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") in response
to

persistent

discrimination against

minority

groups

in

the

United

(rejecting non-replacement requirement because it precludes meritorious claims) .
In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit reasoned that
[a] n employer's failure to hire someone of a different class from the
plaintiff, after the plaintiff's discharge, could be explained in many ways .
. . . [A] n employer may act on gender-based stereotypes, firing women it
perceives as not feminine enough (or as too femin ine) , or disch arging
women who are too aggressive while not doing the same to male
employees.

Id.
Commentators also have noted that an employer's stereotypes may play an
important role in discharge decisions. S ee e.g., 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOY
MENT D1scRIMINATION § 2.1 (2d ed. 1988) (stating employment decisions are often
motivated by decision-makers' stereotypical attitudes); Hellen Hemphill & Ray
Haines, Confronting Discrimination in Your Workplace, HR Focus, July 1, 1998, at S5
(noting prevalency of stereotypical attitudes).
,

15. For a discussion of the federal circuit courts' requirements regarding a
plaintiff's replacement identity in Title VII discrimin atory termination cases, see
infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's development of the discrimina
tory hiring prima fade:; case, see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the federal courts' use of discriminatory hiring prima
fade framework in Title VII discriminatory termination cases, see infra notes 38-85
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts of Brown, see infra notes 86-99 and accompa
nying text.
19. For a discussion and analysis of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Brown,
see infra notes 1 00-71 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the possible consequences of requiring a plaintiff who
alleges Title VII discriminatory termination to show that his or her replacement
was from outside the plaintiff's protected class, see infra notes 172-82 and accom 
panying text.
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States.21 Title VII of the Act, which specifically prohibits discrimination in
the employment arena, was primarily enacted to create equal employment
opportunities for African-American workers. 22 Title VII not only endeav
ors to protect victims of discriminatory hiring procedures, it also p rotects
21. See H. R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2393 (noting prevalence of discrimination against minority grou s, part �l�lady Al�
rican Americans) ; see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 464 ( . The Civil R1glm
Act of l964 was passed in an attempt to bring the concept of equal rights into every
spectrum of life. ") . For a disc ussion of discrimination in the UnitedStates prio� to
the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, see ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA Luc:K GRA·
HAM, T HE SUPREME CouRT, RAcE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1995).

�

�

22. See42 U.S.C .§ 2000e-2 (1995) (prohibiting employment discrimination) ;
H. R . R.EP. No. 88-914, at 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating that
purpose of Title VII was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and infor
mal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, re
S �n .
ligion, or national origin") ; 110 CoNG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement
Humphrey) ("The crux of the problem is to open e mployment opportumues for
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them. " ) ; Ann C.
McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilog;y: The Improper Use of Summm)'
judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C . L. REv. 203, 210 (1993 ) (stating Con
gress stressed equal employment opportunity is basic right when passing Title VII);
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 4, at 60 (noting Congress' primary purpose in enact
ing Title VII was to protect African-American workers from discrimination ) ; see also
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S . 193, 202-03 (1979) (noting that
Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was to create equal employment
opportunities for Africa n Americans) ; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S . 792, 800 (1973) (stating purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality of employ
ment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens") ; Griggs v. Duke PowerCo., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (noting Congress
never intended Title VII to proscribe discriminatory preference for any one
group); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 444 (stating Title VII "was adopted as an
attempt to address various persistent societal inequities") ; Michael ]. Zimmer &
Charles A. Sullivan , The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation:
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences ofDiscrimination, and Burdens of Proof, 9
v. WOMEN's LJ. 25, 30 (1986) {stating Title VII was enacted to address discrim
mauon against African American workers) . For a general discussion of employ
ment discrimination and congressional action prior to the adoption of Title VII,
see generally PAUL BuRSTEN, DISCRIMINATION, J oBs, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 0PPORTUNI1Y IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL
1�96 (1998) .
In addition to Title VII, a plaintiff, claiming employment discrimination on
the basis of the plaintiff's race may allege a violation of 42 U.S.C . §§ 1981 and
1983. See 2 .S.C § 198l(a) (1981) (statin g persons should have equal rights to
:
cont� ct wit m Umted States) ; 42 U. S .C .§ 1983 (1981) (stating citizen s have rights
to b�n� �ct�on under fed�ral laws ) . Section 1981 provides "[a]ll persons within
the J�nsd1ct1on of the Umted States shall have the same right in every State and
Temtory to make and enforce contracts . .. as is enj oyed by white citizens . . . " 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a) . Section 1981 only covers race or ethnic discrimination thus a
plaintiff alleging a breach of an employment contract on the basis of hi or her
sex, religion o� ag � �annot assert a claim under§ 1981. See 42 U.S .C .§ 1981(a)
.
(stating that mmonues have same rights as white citizens) . Section 1983 does not
create any rights, but rather is a vehicle for recovering a federal remedy for feder
ally protect�d rights, such as those rights protected under§ 1981. See 42 U .S.C .
§ 1983 (staung persons may bring action for deprivation of rights under federal
laws). Section 1983 states:

?�

�

� _l.J
�

.

;
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employees from being discharged because of their race, religion,

sex,

color or national origin.2�

An employer violates Title VII by treating an individual less favorably
than persons who do not possess the individual's protected trait.24 An
employer also violates Title VII by implementing a policy that has a dispa
rate impact on a group of people sharing a protected trait.�=· To state a
claim of discriminatory termination successfully under Title VII, the plain
tiff generally must prove disparate treatment by an employer.21; Because
Congress did not provide a statutory framework of proof for disparate
treatment cases, the United States Supreme Court developed a framework
in McDonnell Douglas. 27

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, [or]
custom . .. subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action at law . .. .
Id.

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and prirna facie element-; used in Title
VII cases are also applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims. See ANDREW J. Ruz1c:110 ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT D1scRIMINATION LITIGATION 2 (1989) (noting Title VII standards
for proving discriminatory treatment are interchangeable with !:i 1981 ) .
23. See 4 2 U. S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (stating that it is unlawful for employers to dis
charge employees because of race, sex, religion, color or national origin) . In the
past, most litigation involving Title VII attacked discrimination in hiring. See Don
ohue & Siegelman, supra note 5, at 984 (noting majority of past Title VII litigation
involved discriminatory hiring) . Today, however, the overwhelming majority of
Title VII litigation involves discriminatory termination claims. See id. (noting shift
in litigation from discriminatory hiring to discriminatory discharge cases) ; see also
Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at xv (noting increase in wrongful termination
cases).
24. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (stating Title VII may be violated
by disparate treatment) . The United States Supreme Court defined disparate
treatment in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 4 3 1 U.S.324,
335 n.1 5 (1 977) . The Court stated that disparate treatment occurs when "[t]he
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. " Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note
4, at 449 (defining disparate treatment); Drew S. Days, III, Reali!)', 3 1 SAN DIEGO L.
RF.v. 1 69, 1 80 ( 1994) (same) .
25. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 4 (stating Title VII may be violated
by disparate impact ) .The Supreme Court defined disparate impact in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 4 3 1 U. S.at 334. The Court stated that
disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity. " Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at 449
(defining disparate impact) ; Days, supra note 24, at 180 (same) .
26. See PERRITT, supra note 9, § 2.3 (stating that Title VII plaintiffs usually
prove discriminatio� using disparate treatment theory); ScHLEI & GROSSMAN , supra
note 6, at 594 (notmg overwhelming majority of discriminatory discharge claims
are litigated under disparate treatment theory).
27. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 450 (stating in McDonnell Douglas Su
preme Cou:t �reated series of three shifting-burdens-of-proof for determining
whether plamtiff has suffered employment discrimination in absence of statutory
framework); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 ( 1 993) (stat-
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: Development of the Title \'71

Prima Facie Framework
In McDonnell Douglas, the petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp., fired
the respondent, a Black male, in an effort to reduce the company's total
number of employees. 28

McDonnell Douglas subsequently advertised

available positions for mechanics, the respondent's trade, and the respon
dent applied for re-employ ment.29 After McDonnell Douglas refused

to

rehire the respondent, he sued McDonnell Douglas under Title VII, claim
i ng that he had not been rehired because of his race.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in MrDonnrll

D ouglas to clarify the proper order and nature of p roo f in Title VII individ
ual di sparate treatment cases.:�1 The Court held that a Title VII plaintiff
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina
tion.32 A plaintiff may fulfill this burden by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli
cants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 33
ing in McDonnell Douglas Supreme Court developed order for presentation of
proof in Title VII cases); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
(1981) (noting Court set up allocations of proof and order of presentation of
proof for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 80204 (creating burden-shifting system for Title VII disparate treatment cases).
28. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-96 (stating facts of case). Following
the respondent's discharge, the respondent protested that his discharge and Mc
Donnell Douglas' hiring practices were racially m otivated. See id. at 794. The re
spondent and other protestors illegally stalled cars on the road to McDonnell
Douglas' plant, essentially blocking access to the plant. See id. The respondent
also took part in a "lock-in," in which the respondent and other protestors placed a
chain and padlock on the door to a McDonnell Douglas building, preventing em
ployees from leaving. See id.
29. See id. at 796.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 798, 800 (noting same). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas, see DAVIS & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 240.
32. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see alsoCumpiano v. Banco Santan
der P.R., 902 F. 2d 148, 153 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that Title VII plaintiff has
burden of proving employer discriminated against plaintiff "for a proscribed rea
son");Cunningham , sufrra note 4, at 451 (stating that plaintiffs have initial burden
of establishing prima facie case). In Cumpiano, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
"critical determination in any Title VII suit is whether the complainant has p roven
.
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that an impermissi ble consideration . ..
was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment decision." Id. at
155.
33. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). Court<; have inter
pre _red the first element, which required the plaintiff to show that he or she is a
racial minority, as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she belongs to a pro
tected class. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. , Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229

428
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Further, the Court stated that, depending on a particular Title VII
cas e's fact pattern, the framework might not be applicabie.:H Specifically
developed for plaintiffs who lack direct evidence, the framework allows
plaintiffs to present circumstantial evidence from which the court may in
fer discrimination. �5
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's termination.�6 After the employer fulfil ls this burden the
p laintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the em
p loy er's offered reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination and not
the employer's true reasons for the plaintiff's discharge.:'\?
(10th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to show he or she belongs to protected class
for first prima fade element); Hogan v. Dixon, No. 98-1161, 2000 WL 9680:14, at*�
(7th Cir. May 25, 2000) (same); Byers v . Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.�d 419,
426 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-116:1, 1999
WL 507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (same); see al.so PERRrIT, rn/ml note 9.
§ 2.3 (stating that every person belongs to protected class even if they are not tracii
tional minority).
34. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (uThe facts necessarily will \"ary
in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie p roof required
from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situation."); see also Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not gh·e
guidance for application of framework in other contexts). For a further discussion
of the applicability of the prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases,
see infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text.
35. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 5 8 1 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating Supreme Court developed McDonnell Douglas framework because plaintiffs
rarely have direct evidence); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 4 5 1 (stating Supreme
Court developed prima facie framework for situations where there is no direct
evidence). Examples of direct evidence include a key decisionmaker's pattern of
racial slurs or racist conduct. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 17 (listing exam
ples of direct evidence). Direct evidence may also include testimony of an em
ployer or an employer's written policy, which treats employees who possess certain
protected attributes differently than other employees who do not possess the attri
bute. See job Discrimination, in 45C AM. juR. 2o § 2717 (1993) (noting possible ex
amples of direct evidence in employment discrimination cases) . As commentators
have noted, plaintiffs usually depend on circumstantial evidence to show that an
employer discriminated against them because "few discriminators announce their
bias." RUZICHIO ET AL., supra note 22, at 15.
36. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In a later case, Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, the United States Supreme Court refined the burden

shifting system and stated that the employer does not have to persuade the court
that the employer's actions were motivated by the reasons offered. See Tex. Dep't
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining defendant's
burden in employment discrimination cases). Instead, the employer only must
"raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the employer."

Id.

37. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53
(stating plaintiff must demonstrate employer's proffered reason was not true rea
son for employer's decision). In a later case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the
United States Supreme Court stated that " [ t] he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the elements of the prima
fa �ie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 5 1 1 (1993). This interpretation of the final step in the bur-
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Adaptation of Framework to Discriminatory Discharge Cases

C.

Since the Supreme Court developed the prima facie framework in

McDonnell

Douglas,

a dispute has arisen in the federal courts over the

proper application of the framework in discriminatory discharge cases.:�8
Some com mentators believe that this disagreement exists because the Su
preme Court developed the framework in the context of a discriminatory
hiring case and specifically allowed for flexibility in the application of the
framework.39 In particular, courts disagree over the interpretation of the
framework's fourth element, in which the Supreme Court required plain
tiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show that "the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
[the] complainant's qualifications."40 In partic ular, the discrepancy cen
ters on whether a plaintiff must show non-class replacement to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.41

As Justice Souter recog-

den-shifting system, however, has caused much controversy over what the Supreme
Coun meant by indicating that disbelief of the employer's reasons may be enough
to prove intentional discrimination. SeeChin & Golinsky, supra note 2, at 666 (not
ing criticism and controversy follow ing Court's decision in Hicks).
38. SeeClack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (explaining circuit courts varied in
adaptation of prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases); see also job
Discrimination, in 45B AM. juR. 2o § 1 076 (1993) (examining differences in how
courts view necessity of replacement requirement in Title VII prima fade cases).
For a further discussion of the courts' adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas frame
work to discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 39- 8 5 and accompanying
text.
39. See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (questioning whether McDonnell Doug
las framework applies to discriminatory discharge cases); see also Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 469 (stating that circuit courts defined discriminatory discharge
prima fade elements in absence of Supreme Court's guidance). I n her article,
Malamud noted the ambiguity created by the Court when it stated that the frame
work was to be fle x ible . See M al amud , supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not
address how framework should be applied to Title VII cases). Malamud s tates :
TheCourt did not . . . attempt to give any meaningful guidance as t o
h� w the specification of the required prima facie proof would b e deter
mmed for cases with other facts-or even any guidance about what it
meant for the "facts" to vary. Was the proof requirement set forth in
McDonnell Douglas to apply to all failure-to-hire cases, with other standards
to apply to cases involving discharges, promotions, and so on? . . . As a
result McDonnell Douglas created a 'prima fade case' with a fixed legal
consequence in litigation but the actual strength of the inferences that
can be drawn from the prima facie case vary depending on the strength
of the evidence that supports it.
Id. at 2245-46.
40. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S . at 802; see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
1 1 26, 1 1 3 39 ( 10th i . 1999) (examining other courts' approaches to replace
�
ment reqm�ement); P1vuotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191F.3d 344, 3 5 4 n.6
(3dCir.
1 999) (notmg courts have adopted differing approaches to fourth
element); EM
PLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting courts'
have differing views of fourth
element in discriminatory discharge cases).
41. Compare B�own v �cLean, 159 F.3d 898, 90 5 (4thCir. 1 998} (modifyin
g
:
frai:n�work to reqmre plamtiff to show replacement outside
protected class), with
Mem v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (requirin
g plaintiff to show em-

�

�

Vu .1 ANOVA LAw RF.vrEw

430

nized in St. Mary's Honor Center

v.

[Vol. 46:

p.

421

Hicks, 42 the Court has never specifically

addressed whether the identity of a plaintiffs replacement is

a

relevant

consideration in Title VU discriminatory termination cases. 4:1 Therefore,
the

courts

have

developed

varying

rules

concerning

a

plaintiffs

replacement. 44
Some courts simply apply the McDonnell Douglas framework withoul
modifying the fourth element. 45

Other circuits, however, require plain

tiffs to show non-class replacement and will automatically preclude plain
tiffs from establishing a prima facie case if this burden is not met.46 Still
other circuits list non-class replacement as a required element, but allow
plaintiffs to overcome this requirement by showi ng additional evidence of
discrimination.47
ployer continued to seek replacement after plaintiffs discharg�). ComfmrP K�n
drick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th ( .1r. 2000) (stating
plaintiffs must show only that position was not eliminated), with Byers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating plaintiff who
does not show non-class replacement but provides additional evidence is not pre
cluded from establishing prima facie case).
42. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
43. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n . l (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating, "This court
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material"); see also Kendrick, 220
F.3d at 1227 (noting Supreme Court has not considered relevancy of plaintifrs
replacements in discriminatory discharge cases); Perry, 199 F.3d at 1136 (recogniz
ing that Supreme Court has not adopted requirement that plaintiff show replace
ment was from outside protected class).
44. For a discussion of the federal courts' treatment of the replacement re
quirement in Title VII discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 47-85 and
accompanying text.
45. See, e.g ., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1139 (noting that requiring plaintiff to show
employer continued to seek applicants is su perior standard to those followed in
other courts); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (requir
ing plaintiff to show that replacement continued to perform plaintiff's work after
plaintiff's discharge); Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiff to show e m ployer attempt ed to fill plaintifls job
with replacement); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (requiring plaintiff to show employer
sought replacement for plaintiff); see also Clack-Freeman, su pra note 6, at 4 70 (stat
ing that majority of circuits adopted McDonnell Dou glas framework without chang
ing elements); EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting several circuits hold
that establishment of prima facie case does not depend on plaintifls replace
ment). For a further discussion of circuits a pplying the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie elements without alteration, see infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.

46. See Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. B d., 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, at *2
(4th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside pro
tected class); Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (precluding establishment of prima facie case
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement); see also EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting Fourth Circuit requires plaintiff to show non-class
replacement). For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's d ecision in Brown,
see infra notes 100-71 and accompanying text.

47. See, e.g. , Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating non-class replacement is not necessary); Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218
F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding non-class replacement is not essential to
establish prima fade case); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534
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Courts Holding Plaintiffs Replacement Irrelevant
The federal courts that have adopted the McDonnell Douglas prima fa

de framework without m odification do not require plaintiffs to show non
class replacement.48

Instead, these courts usually require the plaintiff to

show that their position remained open and the employer continued to

seek a replacement.49
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted this approach in Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, lnc./•0 holding that
a plai n tiff does not have to show non-class replacement. 5 1 The Third Cir(llth Cir. 1984) (same) ; see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 1 1 5 (noting
some courts hold that non-class re placeme n t is not necessary if other factors raise
inference of discrimination) ; Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating some
courts articulate fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show non-class replace
ment but noting that these courts do not apply requirement strictly) .
48. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc . , 1 9 1 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (stat
ing that most circuits that have addressed the issue have found plaintiff is not re
quired to prove that plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of protected class) ;

see, e. g., Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 1 48, 155 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (stat

ing plaintiff can fulfill fourth prong without showin g replacement possessed pro
tected attribute) ; see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 1 1 5 (stating that
several circuits have found that "Title VII case does not hinge on the plaintiffs
replacement coming from outside the protected class").
49. See, e.g., Sen�pta, 804 F.2d at 1 075 (requiring plaintiff to show "that his
employer sought a replacement with qualifications similar to his own, thus demon
strating a continued need for the same services and skills" ); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996
(requiring plaintiff to show employer continued to seek applicants to fill position);
see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 470 (stating that courts' simply adopting

framework that requires plaintiff to show employer continued to seek replace
ment) ; cf Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating plaintiff must prove discharge occurred under circumstances from which
inference of discrimination based on membership in class can be drawn ) .
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has also held that a
plaintiff must only show that the employer continued to seek applicants to fill the
plaintiff's position. See Smith, 76 F.3d at 421 (stating plaintiff must show that "a
comparably qualified person" continued to perform plaintiff s work after his or
er d�scharge); Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 2 1 , 24-25 ( 1 st Cir. 1 994) ( agree-

?

��

district court's ruling that plaintiff may establish prima facie showing of
d1scnmmatory discharge by showing "position was filled by someone outside the
protected group, or that 'the employer had a continued need for someone to per
form the same work after [the complainant] left' " ) ; Pagano v. Fran k, 983 F.2d 343,

1 �g

348 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting plaintiff must only show employer sought replace
me� t of "roughly equivalent qualifications" ) ; Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 1 5 3 (stating
.
plamuff must show "employer sought someone of roughly equivalent qualifications
to perform substantially the same work" ) ; Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 88 1 , 899
Ost Cir. 1988) (stating plaintiff only must show that "employer sought someone to
perform the same work after he or she left" ) .
50. 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999).
51. See id.! at 357 ( holding Title VII plaintiff does not have to show replace

ment was outside protected class). The Third Circuit reasoned that requiring a
replacement to be outside the plaintiff's protected class would be inconsistent with
th � �upreme Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 351 (stating that re
qm �ng non-class replacement would not be consistent with Supreme Court's rea
.
somng m McDonnell Douglas). The Third Circuit reasoned that if the Supreme
.
Court believed non-class replacement was essential, the Court would not have re-
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cuit relied, in part, on the United States Supreme Court ' s decision in
O'Connor v . Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.52 In O 'Connor, the Supreme
Court found that a plaintiff who alleges age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ( "ADEA") is not required to show non
class replacement.53 The Supreme Court reasoned that the ADEA pro
tects individuals f rom discrimination, not classes of people.''4 Thus, ADEA
plaintiffs must show only that they "lost out" because of their age, not be
cause of their membership within the ADEA's protected class.''�'

quired the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas to show that the employer hired a wh ite
person . See id. (finding non-class replacement not req uired ) .
52. 5 1 7 U.S. 308 ( 1 996 ) . In O'Connor, a fifty-six year-old plain tiff brought an
action under the ADEA, alleging that his employer had discharged him because of
his age and replaced him with a forty-year-old individual. Sn' id. at 309. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that plai ntiff had
failed to establish a prima facie case because the employer replaced the plaintiff
with a forty-year-old individual, a person who was within the plain tifrs protected
class under the ADEA. See id. at 3 1 0 (discussing disposition of case in Fourth Cir
cuit) . For a discussion of the ADEA, see infra note 53.
53. See O 'Connor, 5 1 7 U.S. at 3 1 2 ( reversing Fourth Circuit's decision and
holding that "the fact that an ADEA plain tiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case").
The ADEA protects employees from employment discrimination on the basis of
age. See 29 U.S .C. § 623(a) ( l ) ( 1 994 ) . Section 623(a) ( l ) provides that " [ i]t shall
be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in dividual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
Id. Although the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, the ADEA
only protects those people who are forty years of age or older. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 631 (a) ( 1 99 4 ) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals
who are at least 40 years of age." ) . For a further discussion of the ADEA, see gener
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (29 U. S. C.A. §§ 621 et seq. ), 24 A.L.R. FED. 808 ( 1 9 75 ) .
54. See O 'Connor, 5 1 7 U.S. at 3 1 2-1 3 ( reasoning that ADEA protects persons
not classes) .
55. See id. at 3 1 2 (rejecting consideration of plaintiffs replacement in AD EA
cases) . Prior t o t h e Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor, the federal courts were
sharply divided over whether a plaintiff i n a n age discrim ination case had to show
that his or her replacement was from outside of the plaintifrs protected class. See
Guy D. Chappel III, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Broadening the
.A, 20 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 2 1 1 , 21 1Scope of Age Discrimination Claims Under the ADF
12 ( 1 996) (recognizing circuit split over whether plaintiff alleging age discrimina
tion had to show replacement was under age forty) ; see also Bernard Mower, Age
Discrimination: Supreme Court Agrees to Clarify Age Discrimination Elements of Proof, 1995
DAILY LAB. REP. 2 1 9 (noting Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether ADEA plaintiff must show non-class replacement) . The Court, however,
clarified that th e ADEA prohibits age discrimination and does not prohibit dis
crimination against employees who are aged forty and older. See O 'Connor, 5 1 7
U.S. at 3 1 2 (reasoning plaintiffs replacement is irrelevant) . In particular, the
Court stated " [ tJ he fact that one person i n the protected class has lost out to an
other person i n the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as h e has lost out
because of his age." Id.

The Third
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Circuit adopted

the

Supreme

Court's

reasoning in

O'Connor and found that the reasoning applied equally to T i tle VII cases.''li
In addition, the Third Circuit stated that an employer may treat a fe male
employee differently than similarly si tuated male employees, but may still
replace the fe male employee with another female.57 Furthermore, the
Third Circuit reasoned that an employer m i g h t hire someone from within
the plaintiff s protected class to avoid a discrimination suit.c;8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also simply
adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for discriminatory discharge
cases."9 In Meiri

v.

Dacon,60 the Second Circuit reasoned that req u i ring a

plaintiff to show non-class replacem e n t was "at odds with the policies un
derlying Title VI I . " 6 1

Subsequently, the Second Circuit has defined the

fourth element even more liberally, req u i ri n g the plaintiff to show "that
his discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of dis
crimination on the basis of his members h i p i n that class. "6�
56. See Pivirolto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 354-55 (finding guidance in O'Connor decision ) .
The Third Circuit analogized Pivirotto's case to O'Connor and foun d that as long as
the plaintiff "loses out" because of his or her protected attribute, the plaintiff's
replacement is irrelevant. See id. at 355 (analogizing case to O'Connor) .
57. See id. at 353-54 (noting that replacement from within protected class does
not necessarily mean plain tiff was not treated differently from employees from
outside plaintiffs protected class). The Third Circuit reasoned that employers
may discharge an employee due to gender-based stereotypes. See id. at 355 (noting
employer may fire women who are too aggressive but may not fire men who are
aggressive).
58. See id. (noting some employers may hire individual from within protected
class to defeat discrimination suit) ; accord Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726
F.2d 1529, 1 535 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984) (noting employer may have hired same class re
placement to avoid suit) .
59. See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 ( 2 d Cir. 1985) (adopting McDonnell
Douglas framework without modification for discriminatory discharge cases ) . In
Meiri., the Second Circuit stated "the appropriate inquiry should be whether the
employer continued to seek applicants to fill the position." Id. at 995; cf

Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 8 1 , 9 1 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding prima
facie case may be established in variety of ways ) . In Chertkova, the Second Circuit
stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas frame
work by showing the employer continued to seek applicants to fulfill the position
or by showing that "preferential treatment [was] given to employees outside the
protected class" or by presenting "actions or remarks made by decision makers that
could be viewed as reflecting a discriminatory animus." Id. For a discussion of the
Second Circuit's subsequent interpretatio n of the fourth prong, see infra notes 6162 and accompan}ing text.
60. 759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1985) .
61. Id. at 996. The Meiri court stated that the McDonnell Douglas elements of
proo� "were not intended to be 'rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' Rather, they
were mtended only to promote the general principle that a Title VII plain tiff must
c�rry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to 'raise [ ] an inference of
discrimination.' " Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Fumco Conslr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 5 7 7 ( 1 978 ) ) .
62. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1 994) . The
Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff could raise an inference of discrimination
under the fourth prong by showing: ( 1 ) the employer continued to seek applicants
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The Uni ted States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in its most rece n t case addressing the issue, Kendrick
Penske Transportation Services, lnc. 6""

v.

In Kendrick, the Tenth Circuit found

that a plaintiff must show only that the e m p loyer did not elim inate the
plaintiffs position after the plaintiffs termination.'i4 To reach this con
clusion, the Ten th Circuit relied on its reasoning in Perry

v.

Woodward. 6"

In Perry , the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejecte d consideration of a plaintiffs
for the plaintiffs position; (2) the employer criticized the plaintiffs perlormance
in ethnically degrading terms; (3) the employer made "invidious comment-; about
others in the e mployee's protected group;" ( 4 ) the employer treated no n-group
members more favorably; (5) the sequence of events leading to the discharge was
discriminatory; or ( 6 ) the timing of the discharge was discriminatory. Id. This
i n terpretation of the fourth element appears to be controlling precedent within
the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 9 1 (2d Cir. 1 996) (stating that
under fourth element plain tiff must show discharge occurred under circumstances
giving rise to inference of discrimination ) ; McKeever v. N.Y. Medical Coll. , No. 9&7066, 1 999 WL 1 79376, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3 1 , 1 999) (same ) ; Badrinauth v. Drey
fus Serv. Corp . , No. 96-20 1 6, 1 998 WL 8 1 34 1 2 , at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1 998)
(same) ; lvaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94-5909, 1998 WL 57077, at *3
(E.D. N.Y. Feb. 5 , 1998) (same ) ; Pappy v . S. Beach Psych. Ctr. , No. 92-CV-5565,
1 996 WL 10889 0 1 , at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1 99 6 ) (same) ; Cianfra no v. Babbitt, 85 1
F. Supp. 4 1 , 45 ( N . D .N.Y. Apr. 28, 1 994) (same ) . But see Budde v. H&K Distrib.
C o . , No. 99-9449, 2000 WL 900204, at * 1 ( 2d Cir. June 29, 2000) (listing fourth
element as requiring plaintiff to show that person not in protected class replaced
plaintiff although element was not at iss ue ) ; Lawson v. Getty Terminals Corp., 866
F. Supp. 793, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating plaintiff may satisfy fourth element by
showing that i ndividuals from outside p rotected class either replaced plain tiff or
were retai ned when plaintiff was terminated ) ; see also Chin & Golinsky, supra note
2 , at 663-64 ("Today, most Second Circuit decisions frame the fourth element as
requiring the plaintiff to have suffered the adverse employment action under cir
cumstances givin g rise to an inference of discrimination . " ) .
63. 220 F.3d 1 220 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) .
64. See id. at 1 227 (stating plaintiffs must show position was not eliminated) .
Before reaching this conclusion, the court examined Tenth Circuit precedent,
which addressed the issue of a plaintiff's replacement. See id. at 1 22 7-29 (address
ing Tenth Circuit precedent). The court noted that early holdings did not require
the plaintiff to show non-class replacement. See id. at 12 27 (same) . The court also
noted that some Tenth Circuit decisions listed the fourth prong as requiring the
plaintiff to show that the plaintiff's replacement was of non-protected status. See id.
at 1 228 (recognizing different standard applied i n some cases) . The Tenth Circuit
distinguished these decisions as dicta and, thus, n o t controlling precedent within
the circuit. See id. at 1 228 (characterizing requirement as dicta) . The Tenth Cir
cuit, however, did not address or distinguish its recent holding in Toth v. Gates
Rubber Co., No. 99-1 0 1 7, 2000 WL 796068 ( 1 0th Cir. July 2 1 , 2000 ) . In Toth, the
Tenth Circuit stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth prong of McDonnell Doug
las by showing: ( 1 ) treatment which was less favorable than treatme n t afforded to
similarly situated employees; (2) replacement by someone outside the protected
class; or (3) the position was not eliminated. See id. at *7 & n. 7 ( listing require
ments for fourth prong) . The Toth court, however, found that the Yugoslavian
plaintiff, who had alleged that her employer discharged her based o n her national
o �igin and/ or gender, had established a prima fade showing of discriminatory
discharge because her employer replaced her with an Anglo male. See id. at *5, *7
(stating plaintiff's allegations and finding plaintiff satisfied fourth element by
showing she was replaced with Anglo male) .
65. 199 F.3d 1 1 26 ( 1 0th Cir. 1999 ) .

NOTE

200 1 ]

435

replacement as unfairly precluding suits by plaintiffs who may have legiti
The Ten th Circuit also rej e cted another common ap

mate claims.66

proach that requires plaintiffs to pres e n t additional evidence that leads to
an inference o f discrimination .67 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this

approach resulted in too much uncertai n ty for the district courts and for
the parties.68

2.

Non-Class

Replacement Is Not Essential if Additional Evidence

Is Present

Several federal c ourts list non-class replacement as an essen tial ele
ment of the framework, but have held that a plaintiffs failure to show non
class replacement does not automatically preclude establishm e n t of a
prima facie case.69

I nstead, these courts c onsider additional evidence

66. See id. at 1 1 37 (stating strict replacement requirement would preclude
meritorious suits) . The Tenth Circuit reasoned that an inflexible rule would
preclude suits against employers who hire and fire minority employees in
an attempt to prevent them from vesting in employment benefits or de
veloping a track record to qualify for promotion . . . [and] would also
preclude a suit against an employer who terminates a woman it negatively
perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to
be subordinate to h e r male co-workers or replaces an African-American
with an African-American who is perceived to 'know his place . '

Id.

67. See id. at 1 1 39 ( fi nding that ap proac h req uiring plaintiffs to present addi
tional evidence of discrimination is inferi or) . For a further discussion of this ap
proach, which requires additional evidence of discrimination when replacement is
from the same class as the plaintiff, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
68. See Perry , 199 U.S. at 1 1 39 (finding requirement of additional evidence is
too uncertain ) . The Tenth Circuit noted that courts adopting this approach have
not explained what types of additional evidence would be sufficient to raise an
inference of discrimination. See id. (noting courts have not provided examples of
sufficient evidence) . The Tenth Circuit found that this lack of guidance c reated
too much uncertainty. See id. (rejecting requirement of additional evidence) .

69. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating that some courts articu
late fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show outside replacement but do not
strictly enforce this element); see, e. g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 8 2 F.3d
157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1 996) (stating plaintiff may be able to show discharge was
result of protected attribute although employer hired same class replacement) .
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this ap
proach . See Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co. , 2 1 8 F.3d 48 1 , 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (stat
ing replacement with non-member of protected class is not essential to
�stablishment of discriminatory discharge prima fade case) ; Byers v. Dallas Morn1�g News, Inc., 209 F.3d 4 1 9 , 42�27 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that replacement
With member of same protected class is outcome-determinative if plain tiff does not
present other evidence of discriminatory intent) ; Nieto v. L&H Packaging Co., 108
F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that replacement with member of same
p�ot�ct�d class oes not preclude establishment of prima facie case of Title VII
d1scnmmatory discharge ) ; Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 86 ( 5th Cir.
198 ) < noting that replacement by member of protected class does not negate
. .
poss1b1hty that discharge was motivated by discrimination ) ; Jones v. W. Geophysical
Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating replacement of a minority
�mployee with non-minority is not only way to create inference of discriminatory
mtent) ; Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1 153, 1 1 55 (5 th Cir. 1979) (finding black
employees established prima facie case of discriminatory termination because em-
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from which discrim in atory intent can be i n ferred.70
The U n i ted States Court of Appeals for t he Seve n t h C i rcuit ado p ted
this approach i n Canon v. Bethlehem Steel

CmtJ. 7 1 The court 1·easo 1 1 e d t hat

the ultimate q u esti on in discri m i n a t o ry discharge cases is " w h e t h e r the
plaintiff has establ ished a log ical reas o n t o beli e\·e t h a t t h e decision re s t s
on a le gally forbidden gro und. " n Thus, the court held t h a t t h e fact t h at a
plain tiff's repl acement is of "ano t h e r race, sex, o r age'' may ra ise an i n ferployer replaced plain tiffs with white e m ployees ) ; SfP alw Cla�·k-Frec m a n , \�1/m1 n o t e
6, at 473-76 ( n oting Fifth Circuit does not preclude cstahl 1 s h rnl' n t of p n m a lane
when plaintiff was replaced by member of plaintiffs protected class ) . /J11t WP Singh
v. Shoney's, I n c . , 64 F.3d 2 1 7, 2 1 9 (5th Cir. 1 995) ( finding w h i t e fc m a k faikd to
_
establish prima facie case of discriminatory disc h arge based on race becausc white
female replaced her) ; Vaughn v. Edel, 9 1 8 F.2d 5 1 7, 52 1 ( :> th Cir-. 1 990) ( stating

plain tiff must show that other employees w h o were non-members of plai ntiffs pro
tected class remained in similar positio ns ) .
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also appears to

have adopted this i n terpretation. See Davenport v. Riven:iew Gardens Sch. Dist. , 30
F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1 994) (stating plaintiff must demonstrate that d isch arge
occurred in circumstances which allow court to i n fer discriminatio n ) ; Walker '" St.
An thony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 ( 8 th Cir. 1 989) (same ) . In Walkn� the
Eighth Circuit stated that plaintiffs who are replaced by members of their pro
tected class may still be able to establish that that they were the "object [ s ] of imper
missible discrimination ." Id. The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that "the sex of
[the plaintiffs] replacement, although a relevant co nsideration, is not necessarily
a determinative factor in answer to either the initial inquiry of whether she estab
lished a prima facie case or the ultimate inquiry of whether she was the victim of

discrimination." Id.

70. See EMPLOYJ\.1ENT,

supra note

6, 1 37, at 1 1 5 (stating that plaintiff's rep lace

ment is "a fact that must be considered i n determining whether the clai mant's
ultimate burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination has been sustained,
rather than whether a prima facie case has been established" ) ; Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 4 78 (stating that these circuits c onsider the plaintiff's replacement
in plaintiffs "overall attempt to prove discriminatory intent" ) ; see also Perry', 1 99
F.3d at 1 1 39 (stating that some circuits allow a plaintiff to establish prima facie if
additional facts are shown from which inference o f discrimination can be shown ) .
71. 82 F.3d 1 5 7 ( 7 t h Cir. 1996 ) .
72. Id. a t 1 59. The Seventh Circuit further s tated that " [ a] n employee may be
able to show that his race or another characteristic that the law places off limits
tipped the scales against him, without regard to the demographic chara c teristics of

his replacement." Id. at 1 58-59. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
relied on the Court's decision in O 'Connor. See id. (examining O'Connor) . The
Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court's reasoning that "laws against dis
crimination protect persons, not classes" is equally applicable to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. The Seventh Circuit utilized a hypothetical situation to d emon
strate O'Connor's applicability in Title VII cases:

Id.

Suppose an employer evaluates its s taff yearly and retains black workers
who are in the top quarter of its labor force, but keeps any white in the
top half. A black employee ranked in the 60th perce ntile of the staff
acc?rding to supervisors' evaluations is l e t go, while all white e m ployees
.
.
_
similarly situated are retamed. This is race discrimination, which the employer cannot purge by hiring another person of the same race later.
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ence of discriminatio n , but non-class replacement is "neither sufficient or
necessary. "73
The U n i te d States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also has
held that a same-class replacement does n o t automatically preclude a
plaintiff from establish i n g a prima facie case.74 The Eleventh Circuit origi
nally adopted this approach in a discri m i natory hiring case, Howard
Roadway Express, Inc.75

v.

In Howard, Roadway Express refuse d to h i re the

plaintiff, a black man and former part-time e mployee of the company, for
perman ent em ploymen t.76 The followi n g year, Roadway Express h i red a
black man to fill the position for which the plain tiff had applied.77 The
Eleventh Circuit fou n d that the plaintiff was n o t precluded from establish
ing a prima facie case, reasoning that plai n tiffs can raise an inference of
discrimination in other ways.78

The Howard court indicated that there

might be an i n ference of discrimination because of a substantial lapse of
time between the plaintiff's application a n d the subsequen t h i ri n g . 79 In
addition, the Howard court stated that because Roadway hired a sam e-class
replacement after t h e plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employ
ment Opportunities Commission , the hiring could have been motivated by
the filing of the

inferred.80
3.

complaint, and

thus,

discrimination

could still be

Courts Considering Non-Class Replacemen t an Essential E/,ement

A small minority of federal courts have adopted a strict approach to
the consideration of a plaintiffs replaceme n t identity. 8 1

In these courts,

the plaintiff is automatically precluded from establishing a prima facie
73. Id. at 5 1 9; see also Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 2 1 8 F.3d 4 8 1 , 485 (5th
Cir. 2000) (" [I] t is well settled that, although replacement with a non-member of
the protected class is evidence of discriminatory intent, it is not essential to the
establishment of a prima facie case under Title VII. " ) .
74. See, e.g. , Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll. , 4 9 F.3d 1 5 1 7 , 1 52 1 ( 1 1 th Cir.
1995) (stating plaintiff must show replacement outside protected class under
fourth element but finding "prima facie case is n o t wholly dependant upon meet
ing the fourth requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test" ) .
75. 726 F.2d 1 529 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984 ) .
76. See id., at 1 534 (describing facts o f case ) .
77. See id.
78. See id. (" [P] roof that the employer replaced the fired minority employee
.
Wlth a non-minority employee is not the only way to create such an inference [of
un lawful discrimination ] . " (quoting Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. of Am. , 669 F.2d
280, 284 (5th Cir. 1 98 2 ) ) ) .
79. See Howard, 726 F.2 d at 1 535 (noting "the lapse of eleven months would
. _
s1gmficantly diminish the reliability of the subsequent hiring as an indicator of
Roadway Express' intent at the time it rejected [the plaintiff s] application " ) .
80. See id. (stating inference of discrimination cannot be ruled out based on
circumstances of case ) .
8 1 . See, e.g. , Lowry v . Bedford County Sch . Bd., No. 98-1 1 65, 1 999 WL 5071 37,
at *2 (4th Cir. 1 999) ( requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside
prote�ted class ) ; Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1 998) ( precluding
.
establishment of pnma fade case because plaintiff failed to show non-class replace-

VruANOVA LAw

438

REVIEW

[Vol. 46: p. 42 1

case of discriminatory termination if the pla intiff fails to show that his or
her replacement is from outside of the plaintiff's protected class.82 The
United States District Court for the Distri c t of Columbia adopted this rea
soning in Kkin v. Derwinski.83 In that case , the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia stated that a n employee alleging disc rimina

tory discharge must show that a person from outside the employee's pro
tected class filled the employee ' s positio n , or that an e m ployee from
outside the protected class with c omparable experience was not termi
nated.84

The U n i te d States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

adopted a similar requirement in Brown v. McLean.8:;

III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

OF

BROWN

\ '.

Mc:LJ-:.4.:V

Accord i n g to the Fourth Circuit's opi n i on in Brown, the plaintiff, Ron
ald A. Brown , a white male, was employed as the City of Baltimore's Ad
ministrator o f Telephone Facilities.86 O n December 3, 1 99 1 , Jacqueline F.
McLean, a black fe male, took office as the C i ty of Baltimore 's Comptroller
and Brown ' s supervisor.87 Upon taki ng o ffice, McLean criticized the lack
ment) ; Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 ( D . D .C. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to
show non-class replacement) .

82. See, e.g. , Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff failed to establish
prima fade case because plaintiff could not show non-class replacement) ; Lowry,
1999 WL 5071 37, at *2 (finding that plaintiff did not establish prima facie case
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement) ; see also Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 479-80 (stating that in United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, plain tiffs who fail to show non-class replacement are p recluded from
establishing prima facie case) .
83. 869 F. Supp. 4 (D .D.C. 1994) .
84. See id . at 4 ( stating criteria for establishing prima fade case of religious
discrimination ) . In Klein, a Jewish employee alleged that her employer, the De
partment of Veteran Affairs, had terminated her based on her religion. See id. at
5-8. The court noted that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case had been
adapted for use in discriminatory termination cases and stated that under the
fourth prong o f the framework the plaintiff must prove that "she was either re
placed by a person not in the protected class, o r such a person with comparable
qualifications and work records was not terminated." Id. at 7; see also Simens v.
Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1 997) (holding plain tiff must show replacement
outside protected class in disparate treatm e n t cases) . Afte r the plaintiff's dis
charge, another Jewish employee took over the responsibilities of the plaintiffs
position; thus the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that someone
outside of her p rotected class filled the position . See Kl.ein, 869 F. Supp. at 8 (find
ing plaintiff did not meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas prima fade frame
work) . In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to allege that her
employer had refused to fire a non:Jewish person who held a similar position as
the plaintiff and who had a similar work performance as the plaintiff. See id. at 8- 10
(same) .
85. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, see infra
notes 1 00-71 and accompanying text.
86. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 900 (stating facts of case ) . As the Administrator of
Telephone Facilities, Brown was responsible for directing the city government's
telephone services. See id.
87. See id.
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of diversity in the office.88 In particular, McLean complai ned that the of
fice portraits were excl usively of white males and had the portraits re
moved from the office.89
On Dece mber 1 8, 1 99 1 , McLean's transition team issued a report sug
gesting that the municipal post office a n d telephone department be com
bined into one department under one manager's supervisio n .9° M c Lean
sent the recommendation to Baltimore 's Board of Estimates, of which Mc
Lean was a voting me mber.9 1

On May 1 3, 1 992, the Board of Estimates

issued its budget recommendations, which i n cluded elimi nating Brown's
position and adding a new position: the Di rector of Comm uni cations
Se rvices.!l2
On May 24, 1 992, Brown received a letter from McLean, i nforming
him that his position was being eliminated.93 On July 1 , 1 992, Rochelle
You ng, a black man , was provisionally appointe d and, subsequently pe rma
nently hired, to fill the newly created Director of Commu nications Ser
vices position.94
On February 7, 1 995, Brown filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland against McLean, the Mayor a n d the City
of Baltimore under Title VII.95 Brown clai m e d that his position had been

88. See id. ( stating facts of case ) .
89. See id.
90. See id. ( noting transition team 's recommendations ) . The report stated
that "the restructuring would 'use present personnel on board ' and [would] ' take
maximum advantage of proven personnel capabilities."' Id. at 90 1 .

91 . See id. at 90 I .

92. See id.
93. See id. The letter stated that the elimination of Brown's position was not
Brown's fault and stated that the position was being eliminated based on McLean's
transition team 's recom mendations. See id. ( n o ting contents of termination
letter) .
94. See id. (stating Young was provisionally appointed to newly created posi
.
tion and began working in Brown 's old office) . Prior to Brown's departure, Brown
met with McLean for an exit interview, during which time Brown told McLean that
he was going to apply for the Director of Communications Services position. See id.
h e Baltimore City Regulations require that any person, whose position is abol
ished, be placed on a re-employment list for a position that "most nearly approxi
mate (s] the position abolished." Id. Under the Baltimore City Regulations, a
person on the re-employment list takes priority over any other person who may
apply for the position. See id. (describing city regulations) . Brown , however, was
not placed on the list for the Director of Communications Services position. · See id.
(stating there is conflicting evidence about why Brown was not placed on re-em
ployment list for Director of Communications Services position ) . Instead, Brown
placed on the re-employment list for the position of Telephone Supervisor, for
whJCh there was no vacancy. See id. The Telephone Supervisor is a working tele
phone operator, which requires a high school education, whereas Brown had an
M.B.A. and no experience as a switchboard operator. See id. The Director o f Com
mun ications Services position was advertised in the newspaper, but Brown never
apph.� d for the position. See id. (stating there was open application process for
_
pos1t1 on ) .

!

w�

95. See id. at 898, 901 (recounting disposition of case) .
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eliminated and he had been discharged because of his gender.HH The dis
trict court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Brown's claim o f discriminatory discharge based on gende r . �17 The district
court reasoned that because a male filled the Director of Communications
Services position, Brown had not been a victim of gender discrimination.98
Brown appealed the court's decision and requested that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit find that the district

court

erred in gra n ting s um mary judgment against him on his gender discrimi
nation charge.99

96. See id. at 898, 901 (noting claims in district court) . Brown also alleged a
violation of his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198 1 and 1 983, as well
as race discrimination under Title VII. See id. at 90 1 . The district court also
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of unlawful
discrimination in the elimination of Brown 's position. See id. 9 0 1 -02. The court
refused to grant summary judgment on Brown 's failure to hire claim, finding that
there was a genuine question of material fact that Brown was not hired because of
his race. See id. The court denied Brown 's motion for summary judgment in
which Brown had argued that the city's affirmative action claim c onstituted a race
and gender based employment policy in violation of Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. The case went to trial on Brown 's Title VII failure-to-hire
claim and on Brown's § 1981 and § 1 983 claims against the city. See id. at 902. The
court granted the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Brown
had not produced sufficient evidence that there was a violation of § 1 9 8 1 and
§ 1983, and that Brown did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
See

id.

97. See id. at 901-02 (noting disposition of case in district court) . The defend
ants also claimed that the plaintiff had not been unlawfully discriminated against
by the elimination of his position as the Administrator of Telepho n e Facilities. See
id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
this claim. See id. The defendants also claimed that they were entitled to summary
j udgment based on the plaintiffs inability to show that he was not hired for the
Director of Communications Services because of his race. See id. The district court
refused to grant summary judgment o n this claim, finding that the plaintiff had
established a genuine issue of material fact that he was not hired for the position
because of his race. See id. (noting district court's ruling on failure to re-hire
claim).

id. (recounting district court's reasoning).
99. See id. at 905 (noting basis for appeal ) . On appeal, the Fourth Circuit also
98. See

affirmed the district court's finding that Brown had not established a prima fade
case of failure-to-hire and affirmed the denial of partial summary judgment on
Brown's claim that the city's affirmative action plan constituted a race or gender
based employment policy. See id. (noting circuit ruling) . The dissent, however,
argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment on Brown 's Title VII
race discrim.ination cla �m shoul� .be reversed. See id. at 906. In support of its argu
ment, the dissent provided add1uonal evidence indicating discrimination, further
noting tha � by �he time McLean left office there were no Caucasians and only one
male workmg m the Comptroller's office. See id. at 906-08 (stating additional
facts) .

IV.

ANALYSIS OF

THE FouRTH
A.

1.
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CIRcun's HOLDING IN BROWN

v.

McLEAN

Narrative Analysis

Requiring Replacemen t Outside Protected Class

The Fourth Circuit initiated review of Brown's gender discrimination
claim by stating that " [i] n order to make out a prima facie case of discri mi
natory termination, a plaintiff must ordi narily show that the position was
ultimately filled by someone not a m ember of the protected class." 1 00 In
reaching this proposition, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in

Hicks, as well as the district court's d e cision i n Klein, as examples of cases
in which courts required plaintiffs to show n o n-class replace m ents. 10 1
2.

The Fourth Circuit Notes There Are Exceptions

The Fourth Circuit, however, noted that t here were three distinct ex
ceptions to the non-class requirement. 1 02 First, the court listed t h e Su
preme Court's decision in O'Connor as a n exception. 1 0 3

The Fourth

Circuit stated that age discrimination cases like O 'Connor, in which an em
ployer replaces the plaintiff with a significantly younger person from
within the plaintiffs p rotected class are exceptions to the replac ement re
quirement. 104 T h e Fourth Circuit, however, did not address this excep
tion in its analysis of Brown 's claim. 1 05
The second exception the Fourth Circuit discussed was cases in which
there has been a significant length of time between the plaintiffs applica
tion for employment and the employer's hiring of another individual
within the same protected class. 106

In support of this exception, the

Fourth Circuit noted the Eleventh Circuit's d ecision in Howard, in which
the Eleventh Circuit stated that a significant p eriod of time between the
employer's rej ection of the plaintiff and the e mployer's subsequent h iring
of a same-class replacement does not eliminate an inference of discrimina-

100. Id. at 905.
101. See id. at 905 (citing St. Mary 's Honor Ctr. v . Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993); Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) ) .
. 102. See id. at 905 (stating that courts have noted exceptions in limited situa

�1ons). In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioners were not challeng
mg the district court's finding that the respondent established a prima facie
.
showing by proving that a white man ultimately filled the respondent's position.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating that establish
ment of prima fade case was not being questioned) .

103. See B rown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing O 'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308 (1996) (listing exceptions to non-class requirement) ) .
104. See id. at 905 (stating that courts may find exceptions where employers
replace plaintiffs with younger persons within same class) .

105. See id. at 906 (finding none of exceptions were applicable and beginning
analysis with second exception) .

�

. � 06. See d. (finding that significant lapse of time between application and
.
rehmng declSlon
would create exception to non-class replacement requirement) .
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In addressing this exception, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that

even if Brown had applied for the Directo r of Communication s Servi ces
position, the l e n gth o f time between Brown 's application and the city's
hiring of another male would not have been significant en ough to place
Brown within the second exception . 1 08
The final exception that the Fourth C i rcuit noted was an emp l oyer's
hiring of a same-class replacement that is in tended to mask the e m ployer's
discrimination against the plain tiff. 1 09 The Fourth Ci1-cui t examined this
exception and found that Brown had n o t presented any evidence that in
dicated that the city i n tended to disguise gender discri m i nation against
Brown by hiring another male. 1 10

Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that

Brown failed to establish a prima fac i e sh owing of discrimin atory dis
charge and affirmed the district court's grant of motion for sum mary
judgment. 1 1 1

B.

Critical Analysis

The Fourth Circuit's holding i n Brown is in consistent with the conclu
sions reached by all other federal circ u i t courts that have addressed the
issue. 1 1 2 The court's inconsistent holding may stem from the manner in
which the court a nalyzed Brown 's claim. 1 1 3 The court set forth a rule stat
ing that the plain tiff must show his employer hired a non-class replace107. See id. (citing Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. , 726 F.2d 1 529 ( 1 1 th Cir.
1 984) ) . For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Howard, see
supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
1 08. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 906 ("Even if Brown had applied for the DCS posi
tion, the city hired another male for the position at the same time that Brown
would have been considered for the position. " ) .
109. See id. at 905 ( noting an exception to non-class replacement requirement
is created "where the employer's hiring of another person within the protected
class is calculated to disguise its act of discrimination toward the plaintiff') .
1 1 0. See id. at 906 (stating that evidence presented was not sufficient to estab
lish that city was attempting to mask discrimination by hiring another male ) .
l l l . See id. at 906.
1 1 2. Compare Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 ( requiring plaintiff to show non-class re
placemen t) , with Williams v. Trader Publ 'g Co., 2 1 8 F.3d 48 1 , 485 (5th Cir. 2000)
(finding non-class replacement is not essential to establish prima facie case ) , Car
son v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 1 59 ( 7th Cir. 1996) (stating non-class
replacement is not necessary) , Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 4 1 3 , 4 2 1 ( 1 st
Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiff to simply show replacement conti nued to perform
plaintiffs work after plaintiff's discharge ) , Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804
F.2d 1072, 1 075 (9th Cir. 1 986) (requiring plaintiffs to show simply that employer
sought replacement for plaintiff) , Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1 985)
(requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff) , and How
ard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1 529, 1 534 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984) (finding non
class replacement is not necessary).
1 1 3. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Brown, see
infra notes 1 1 8-71 and accompanying text.
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ment and then listed three exceptions to the rule. 1 1 4 Although the court
cited spe cific cases to support the rule and its exceptions, the court d i d
not analyze the reasoning i n these cases. 1 1 5 I n addition, unlike other fed
eral circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit did n o t address the purpose of Title
VII and the purpose of the prima fade case. 1 1 6 As a result, the court
reached an inconsistent result. 1 1 7

1.

Deve!,opment of Non-Class R£placement Requirement Rests on Possibly

Flawed Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit erroneously cited the Supreme Court's decision i n

Hicks

as

providing the applicable law for i n terpretation of the fourth ele

ment of the prima facie framework. 1 1 8 In particular, the Fourth Circuit
cited Hicks as requiring Title VII plain tiffs to show non-class replace
ment. 1 19 The Supreme Court in Hicks, however, did not address whether
a plaintiff must show non-class replacemen t because the plaintiff's estab
lish ment of a prima fade case was not at issue i n Hicks. 1 20 In fact, the
dissent in Hicks expressly stated that the Supreme Court has never ad
dressed the relevancy of a plaintiff's replacement i n the context of a dis
criminatory discharge case. 1 2 1 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's reliance o n

1 1 4. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff must show non-class re
placement to establish prima fade case and stating that there are three exceptions
to the requirement) .
1 1 5. See id. at 905-06 (citing other federal circuit cases as examples of Fourth
Circuit's list of exceptions, but not analyzing reasoning of these cases ) .
1 1 6. See id. at 905-06 (failing to address underlying policy and purpose o f
prima fade case and o f Title VII ) . Federal circuit courts that have addressed the
purposes of Title VII and of the Title VII prima fade cases have adopted more
lenient approaches than the Fourth Circuit's strict non-class replacement requi re
ment. See, e.g., Mei.Ti, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting purpose of Title VII and prim a facie
case and adopting McDonnell Douglas framework in its original form ) . In Meiri, the
Second Circuit stated that the non-class replacement requirement was "at odds
with the policies underlying Title VII." Id. The court further noted the flexibility
of the prima fade elements. See id. (stating that prima fade elements were not
intended to be applied rigidly) .
1 1 7. For a further discussion of the inconsistency of the Fourth Circui t's hold
ing, see infra notes 1 18-71 and accompanying text.
1 18. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 ("In order to make out a prima fade case of
discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position ulti
mately was filled by someone not a member of the protected class." (citing St.
Mary 's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U .S. 502 (1993) ) ) .
1 19. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing Hicks as requiring plaintiff to show non
class replacement requirement) .
120. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating
" [p] etitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that respondent satis
fied the minimal requirements of such a prima fade case " ) . After noting that the
plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case was not at issue, the Court proceeded
to quote the district court's prima facie elements. See id. In the district court's
opinion, it stated the fourth element as "the position remained open and was ulti. mately filled by a white man." Id.

121. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.l ( 1993) (Souter, ] . , dissenting) ("This court
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of
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Hicks resulted in the application of an improper standard to Brown 's dis
criminatory discharge claim . 1 22
The Fourth Circuit also cited the district court's holding in Klein

as

supporting the replacement require m e n t. 1 2 :-\ Although the district court
did hold that a plain tiff must show n on-class replace m e n t, the court's
holding directly confl icts with the approac hes adopted by all federal cir
cuit courts of appeal that have addressed t h e issue . 1 2 4 For exam ple, so me
federal courts-i ncluding the Seco n d , Ten th and Third Circuit'i-do not
look at a plai n tiffs replacement, but instead require a plaintiff to show
e i ther that th e employer continued to seek a replace ment for the plai ntiff,
or that the discharge occu rred i n circumstances giving rise to an i n ference
of discri minati on . 1 25 Other circuits that have addressed the issue do con
sider a plain tiff's replacement, but u n l ike the Kl.ein court, these c i rcuit
courts do not preclude a plaintiff who fails to show non-class replacement
from establishing a prima facie case if the plain tiff can provide other evi
dence of discriminati o n . 1 26 Thus, although the Fourth C i rcuit correctly
cited Klein as imposing a strict replacement requirem e n t on Title Vl l
plaintiffs atte mpting to establish a prima facie case of discri mination re
sulting from their termination, the Fourth Circuit's re liance o n Klein
caused the court to adopt an approach that varies from the approaches
adopted by all other circuit courts . 1 2 7
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and this issue is not
before us today. " ) .
1 22. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's erroneous reliance on Hicks, see
notes 1 1 8-2 1 and accompanying text.

supra

1 23. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing Klein in support of non-class replace
ment requirement) .

1 24. Compare Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1 994) (requiring
plaintiff to show non-class replacement) , and Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8
( D .D.C. 1997) (same ) , with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp. , 220 F.3d 1 220,
1 228 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) ( holding plaintiff must show employer did not elim inate
position after plaintiff's discharge ) , Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d
1 48, 153 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (finding plaintiff must show only employer sought replace
ment), and Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc . , 1 9 1 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999) ( hold
ing replacement requirement is "inconsistent with Title VII " ) .
1 25. See, e.g. , Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1 229 (stating plaintiff must raise inference
of discriminatio n to establish prima fade case of discriminatory discharge ) ;
Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F. 3d a t 356 ( requiring plaintiff to show circumstances that give rise to
inference of discrimination in order to establish prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge ) ; Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 ( 2 d Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiffs
to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff) .
1 26. See, e.g. , Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 4 1 9 , 426-27 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that same-class replacement is outcome-determinative if plain
tiff does not present other evidence of discri minatory intent) ; Carson v.
Bethelehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 1 58 ( 7th Cir. 1 996) (stating plaintiff may be
able to show that discharge was result of protected attribute although employer
hired same-class replacement) ; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc . , 726 F.2d 1 529,
1 534 (stating that non-class replacement is not only way to establish prima facie
case) .
127. See Klein, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 ( D . D.C. 1 994) (requiring plaintiff to show
non-class replacement to establish prima fade case ) . But see Clack-Freeman, supra
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Misapplied Reasoning Leads to Hawed L st
i of Exceptions
Another example of the Fourth Circuit' s misguidance is its interpreta

tion of the list of exceptions. 1 '.!8 First, the c ourt incorrectly applied the
Supreme Court's O 'Con nor decision as a unique exception for age discrimi
nation cases. 1 �9

Because the Supreme Court's decision in O 'Connor in

volved the ADEA, not Title VII, other circuit courts that have examined
the decision in the context of Title VII do not view it as an exception to
the replacement requirement. 1 'w Instead, many federal courts rely o n the
decision as supporting the propositio n that Title VII protects individuals
from discrimination, but does not protect cl asses of people from discrimi

nation.1 3 1 Thus, these courts rely on O 'Connor in arguing that a plaintiffs
repl acem en t should not be the sole criteria in determining whether a
plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of discriminatory termina
tion.132 For example, the Third Circuit in Pivirotto argued that the Su
preme Court's reasoning in O 'Connor applied equally to Title VII and
stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show that he or she "lost out" because
of a protected trait. 1 33 Additionally, in Carson, the Seventh Circuit relied
note 6, at 469 ( stating most courts either simply adopted McDonnell Douglas frame
work or do not strictly enforce non-class replacement requirement) ; see also Perry•,
199 F.3d at 1 1 38-39 (summarizing circuits' adoption of lenient approach to re
placement requirement) . In examining other circuits' approaches to the replace
ment requirement the Tenth Circuit found:
&veral circuits . . . have held that a plain tiff can satisfy the prima facie
burden without proving that the position was filled by an individual who
does not share the protected attribute. Some circuits have concluded
only that a plaintiff is not precluded from meeting the prima facie bur
den by an inability to demonstrate that the replacement employee does
not share [his or] her protected attribute.

Id.

128. For a critique of the Fourth Circuit's list exceptions, see infra notes 1 2959 and accompanying text.
129. See Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905 9th Cir. 1 998) (citing O'Connor
as example of age discrimination excepti on ) .

130. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (examining O 'Connor decision and us
.
_
mg 1t to support argument in Title VII discriminatory discharge case ) ; Carson, 82
F.3d at 1 58 (same ) .
1 3 1 . See Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (stating O'Connor reasoning applies i n gen
der and race context); Carson, 82 F.3d at 1 58 (stating discrimination laws protect
people not classes) .
1 32. See :ivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning "ap
.
plies equally m gender or race context: 'The fact that one person in the protected
cl �ss has l ost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant [ to the
_
pnma fac1e case ] , so long as [s] he has lost out because of [her gender] "' (quoting
O 'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7 U.S. 308 , 3 1 2 ( 1 996) ) ) ; Carson, 8 2 F.3d
a� 1 58 � stating that Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable to Title VII
_
dtscnmmatory
discharge cases) .
1 33 . See Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (rejecting non-class replacement require
ment after examining and adopting O'Connor reasoning) . The Third Circuit
found that proof of discrimination should not be limited to fac t that plaintiff was
or �as not r� placed by someone from outside his or her protected class. See id.
.
(rejectmg stnct non-class replacement require m e n t) .
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on the Supreme Court's reason i ng that " ( l ] aws against discrimination pro
tect persons, n o t classes" to fi n d t h a t Title V I I plaintiffs a r e not required

to

show non-class replacement. 1 34
If the Fourth Circuit had applied the Supreme Court's reasoning as
the Third Circuit did in Pivirotto o r as the Seventh Circuit did in Carson,
the Fourth Circuit may have held that a plaintiffs replacement is an irrele
vant consideration in the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimina
tory discharge. 1 35

Because the Fourth Circuit classified O 'Connor as an

exception to the replacement req uiremen t for ADEA cases, its reasoning is
inconsiste n t with the reaso ning of courts that have addressed the same
issue . 1 :-16 As a result, the Fourth Circuit has made it more difficult for
plaintiffs i n

the

Fourth Circuit to overcome a motion for su mmary

judgment. 1 37
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's classification of the Eleventh Cir
cuit's decision in Howard is also flawed. 1 38 The Eleventh Circuit in Howard
adopted the requirement that the plain tiff must show o n ly "circumstances
which give rise to an inference of discrimi nation . " 1 39 Once the Eleventh
Circuit found the plaintiff had established an inference of discrimination,
the court examined facts that may act to rule out an established inference
of discrimi nation, i ncluding the le ngth of time between the plaintiffs ap
plication for employment and the h i ring of a replacement. 1 40 Therefore,
the Eleven th Circuit treated the lapse o f time not as an exception to the
replacemen t requirement, but as evidence that may be considered while
determining if an i n ference of discrimination was improperly drawn . 1 4 1
1 34. Carson, 82 F.3d at 1 58.
135. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning uap
plies equally to in gender or race context: The fact that one person in the pro
tected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant
to the prima facie case, so long as she has lost out because of her gender" ) ; Carson,
82 F.3d at 1 58 (stating that Suprem e Court's reasoning is equally applicable to
Title VII discriminatory discharge cases) .
136. Compare Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1 998) (stating age
discriminatio n cases are exceptions to non-class replacement requirement) , with
Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (applying O'Connor reasoning to Title VII cases and re
jecting non-class replacement requirement) , and Carson, 82 F.3d at 158 (same ) .
1 37. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 906 (affirming grant o f summary judgment be
cause plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement) .
138. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's flawed reliance on the Eleventh
Circuit's holding i n Howard, see infra notes 1 39-46 and accompanying text.
139. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1 53 4 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984 )
(quoting Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 ( 5 th Cir. 1982) ; Tex.
Dep 't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 ( 1 98 1 ) ) .
1 40. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 (determining whether lapse of time and
hiring after EEOC filing eliminates inference of discrimination ) .
1 4 1 . Compare id. (stating " [t]he hiring . . . would scarcely rule out the infer
ence of discrimination in connection with the earlier denial of Howard's applica
tion") , with Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating that generally plaintiffs must show non
class replacement but exception exists where there is significant time be tween em
ployment application and hiring of replacement) .
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The Fourth Circuit in Brown, however, applied opposite reasoning of
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Howard. 1 42 By stating that a plaintiff
must meet the replacement requirement before a prima facie case of dis
crimination could be established, the Fourth Circuit limited the situations
from which discrimination could be infe rred. 1 4� Thus, unlike the Elev

enth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit began its decision by assuming discrimina
tion could not be inferred in Brown 's case. 1 44 Then, instead o f examining
the lapse of time to determine if an i n ference of discrimination could be

"eliminated," as the Eleventh Circuit did i n Howard, the Fourth Circuit
looked at the lapse of time to see if an i n ference of discrimination could
be "drawn." 1 45 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit erred in applying the Elev
enth Circuit's reasoning in Howard. 146
The Fourth Circuit also misapplied several circuit courts' reasoning
that employers may h i re another individual from within the pro tected
class to disguise discrimination against the plaintiff. 1 47

Federal circuit

courts that have addressed this possibility have relied on it to support argu
ments that a plaintiffs replacement should n o t be considered i n deter
mining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie s h owing of
discrimination . 1 48 For example, in Pivirotto, the Third Circuit argued that
142. For a comparison of the Fourth Circuit's reason ing and the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 1 43-46 and accompanying text.
143. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 1 9 1 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1 999)
("We can find no justification for limiting the proof necessary to create this infer
ence [of discrimination] to the potentially irrelevant and only marginally probative
fact that she was (or was not) replaced by a man . ) .
"

144. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating plaintiffs must show they were re
placed by someone outside their protected class to make out prima fade case of
discriminatory discharge ) .
145. Compare id. at 905-06 (stating that there are three exceptions to non-class
replacement rule and examining length of time to determine if exception could
be drawn) , with Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 ( stating that lapse of time would scarcely
eradicate pre-existing inference of discrimination ) .
146. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's application of Howard 's lapse of
.
time argument, see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
147. See Brown, 1 59 F.2d at 905 (stating that exception may occur when em
�loyers hire individuals from protected class to mask discrimination against plain
tiff) . For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's misapplication of the
argu!°ent that an employer may hire a same-class replacement to avoid a lawsuit,
see infra notes 1 48-53 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Perry v. Woodward, 1 9 9 F.3d 1 1 26 , 1 1 37 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) (stat
ing inf1 7xible rule would preclude suits b y employees whose employers replaced
them with protected class member to avoid law suit) ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355
(noti �g employer may replace plaintiff with member of protected class to avoid
lawsuit); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (recognizing hiring after claim filed with EEOC
cannot rule out inference of discrimination) .
T �e �hird Circuit stated the fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within
the plamtiff's protected class can be explained in many ways. See Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d
at 355 (rejecting replacement requirement on basis that replacement within class
do�s no � necessarily indicate that employer did not discriminate) . Therefore, the
Third Circuit held that it w?uld be inconsistent with Title VII to make a plaintiff
.
meet the replacement reqmrement. See id. (same) . The Third Circuit, howeve r,
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an employer might hire a replacemen t from within the plaintiffs pro
tected class to hide an act of discriminati o n and thus avoid a laws u i r. 1 ·1!1 In

addition, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the employer in Hmoard may
have hired a same-class replacemen t to avoid a discrim ination suitY'0
These circuits, h owever, did not recognize that a plaintiff must p rO\·e that
the employer replaced the plaintiff with a member of the plai n ti ff s pro
tected class to avoid a lawsuit. 1 5 1 In con trast, the Fourth Circuit treats this
argument as something that the plaintiff must prove before a plaintiffs
replacement beco m es irrelevant. 1 52

Thus, the Fourth Circ u i t ' s requir e

ment of proof o f the employer's intent to mask discrimin ation creates a
higher obstacle for plaintiffs to overcom e i n the prima facie stage than
that which is applied in other circuit courts. 1 5:�
The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize other situati ons in whic h a
plaintiff may h av e a me ritorious claim of discrim ination even though the
employer hired a same-class replaceme n t. 1 5 4 For example, both the Third
and Tenth Circuits iden tified situations where an e m pl oye r may disc harge
an employee based on the employers ' stereotypical images of the employ
ees' protected class. 155

This possibil i ty prompted the Third and Tenth

Circuits to adopt a lenient approach to the plai ntiffs burden at the prima
facie stage . 1 56 Under a lenient approach like that adopted in the Tenth
and Second Circuits, plaintiffs who have m e ritorious clai m s are able to
survive a motion fo r summary j udgme n t a n d the burden shifts to the emstated, "The fact that a female plaintiff claiming gender discrimination was re
placed by another woman might have some evidentiary force , and it would be pru
dent for a plaintiff in this situation to counter (or explain) such evide n c e . " Id.
1 49. See Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (noting that employers may replace plaintiffs
with members of plain tiffs' protected class to avoid discrimination suit) .
1 50. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 ( recognizing hiring after claim filed with
EEOC cannot rule out inference of discrimi n ation ) .
1 5 1 . See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (failing to recognize that plain tiff must prove
that employer hired same-class replacement) ; Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 5 35 (same) .
1 52. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905-06 (finding employer did not
with protected individual to hide discriminatio n ) . The Fourth
"Brown has [not] presented any evidence that the city's hiring of
DCS position was designed to hide discrimination against Brown on
gender." Id. at 906.

replace Brown
Circuit stated,
a male for the
the basis of his

1 53. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 ( n oting that courts apply de minimis
burden on plaintiffs during prim a fade stage ) .
154. See Brown_, 1 �9 F.3d �t 905-06 (failing to discuss situations in which plain
.
tiffs may have mentonous claims and are replaced by individual from within pro
tected class ) .
155. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1 1 26 , 1 1 3 7 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) ( stating that
employers may fire women who they believe are feminists or fire African-Ameri
cans �ho do not "know their place") ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (stati n g employers
may discharge employees who do not meet employers' stereotypical image ) .
1 �6. See Perry, 1 99 F.3d �t 1 1 37 (rejecting strict replacement requirement be
cause It woul d pr�clu�e m e �1torious claims) ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 ( remarking
.
b �cause of s1tuauons m which employers discrimi nate against plaintiffs but still
hue same-class replacement for plaintiff, it is i n consistent with Title VII to require
plaintiff to show n on-class replacement) .
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ployer to present reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. 1 57

In the Fourth

Circuit, however, plain tiffs that have meritorious claims, but are replaced

by an individual from their protected class, would not be able to su rvive a
mo ti on for summary judgment. 1 58 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's failure to

consider the possibility that plaintiffs may be discriminated against despite
the fact that their employers hired a same-class replacement results in the
unjust dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims. 1 59
Failure to Address Underlying Policy Possibly Undermines Decision

3.

Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit failed to
consider the purpose of the prima facie case, which is to "eliminate the
most obvious, lawful reasons for the defendant's actio n. " 1 60 For example,

in Perry , the Tenth Circuit examined the purpose of the prima facie case
and found that an inference of discrimination is raised when a plaintiff
eliminates the two most common reasons for termination: "lack of qualifi
cation or the elimi n ation of the job. " 1 6 1 Fe deral courts, including the
Tenth Circuit in Perry, also have noted that elimination of the plain tiffs
position does not prevent a plai ntiff from establishing a prima fade
case. 1 62 Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had applied the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit and of other federal courts, Brown's claim would h ave most
likely survived the city's motion for summary j udgment by simply showing
that the city sought applicants for the Director of Communications Ser
vices position . 1 6 3
157. See, e.g., Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 1 40 ( stating that after plaintiffs raise inference
of discrimination burden shifts to employer to dispel inference of discrimination).
1 58. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (listing examples where plaintiffs may
have meritorious claims but are replaced by members of their protected class ) ;
McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (stating plaintiffs burden a t prima facie stage was
intended to be de minimis but courts tend to use prima facie case to defeat plain
tiffs' claims) .
159. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize situations in
which plaintiffs may have meritorious claims, but are replaced by someone from
the plaintiffs protected class, see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
160. Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 35 1 . In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit stated that requir
.
mg a plaintiff to show non-class replacement did not eliminate common, lawful
reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. See id. (stating that requiring plain tiff to show
man replaced her did not eliminate common, lawful reasons for discharge ) . The
Third Circuit distinguished situations in which a plaintiff could not prove that he
�r she was qualified for the position and stated that in these situations the plain
ll s case should fail because the plaintiff failed to eliminate a lawful reason for the
discharge. See id. (distinguishing failure to show qualification for job from failure
to show non-class replacement) .
161. See Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 1 40.

�

162. See id. at 1 1 40 n . 1 0 (noting elimination of job does not necessarily elimi
nate discrimination claim ) ; accord Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 ( 2 d Cir. 1 985)
.
(s �tmg t at elimination of position should not prevent plaintiff from establishing
pnma facie case) .

�

163. See gen eraUy Clack-Freeman , supra note 6, at 486 (noting that simply ap
.
p ymg McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII cases would allow discriminatory
discharge claims to survive summary judgment) .

�
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In addi tio n , the Fourth Circuit d i d n o t add ress the m a n n e r i n which

the prima fac i e elements were i n tende d to be applied. 1 i;4 As the Second
Circuit recogn ized in Meiri, the elem e n ts of proof in an e mp l oyment dis
crim ination case "were not intended to be ' rigid, mechanized or ritual is
tic. ' " 1 65 Instead, the elements of proof were only intended to make the
plaintiff "carry t h e i n i tial burden of offering evidence adequate to ' raise [ ]
an inference o f discrimi nation . "' 1 6 6 Additionally, courts have recognized
that a plai ntiff's burden at the prima facie stage is de mi n i m is . 1 m Circuit
courts that have addressed the flexibility of the prima facie case and the
plaintiffs de m i n imis burden have tended to adopt a more l e n i e n t ap
proach than the strict approach that t h e Fourth Circuit applies. 1 1)8 The
Fourth Circu i t ' s adoption of a rigid rul e that plain tiffs must show n o n-class
replacement con trave nes the purpose of the prima facie case . rnu

I f the

Fourth Circuit would have applied a m o re lenient approach l i ke other
circuit courts, Brown may have been able to establish a prima fa c i e case by
showing that t h e city sought a replacem ent. 1 70 Then Brown would have
met his de m i n i mis burden, and the burden would have s h i fted to the

A simple adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas elements in the disc harge

arena serves the pu rposes originally envisioned by the [Supreme] Court,
by protecting claims with merit from automatic dismissal, while allowing
claims based o n thin evidence to b e later disposed of at stage three,
where the ultimate issue of discrimination is considered.
Id.
164. See Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1 998)
address purpose of prima facie case ) .

(failing to

1 65. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U . S . 567, 577 ( 1978) ) .
1 66. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (quoting Furnco, 438 U. S. at 577 ) .
167. See id. a t 996 ( noting that prima fade e lements were only i n tended to
make plaintiff carry i nitial burden and were n o t intended to be inflexible ) ; see also
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that Supreme Court did not intend
plaintiffs "prima facie burden to be onerous" ) .
168. See, e.g. , Perry v. Woodward, 1 99 F.3d 1 1 26, 1 1 37 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) ("The
imposition of the inflexible rule . . . is untenable because it could result in the
dismissal of meritorious claims.") ; Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting flexibility of prima
facie elements and finding that plaintiff must only raise inference of
discrimination) .
1 69. See generally Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (stating that because eleme nts of proof
were intended to be flexible, imposition of n on-class replacement requi rement on
plaintiffs contrave nes policies underlying Title VII ) .
1 70. See, e.g. , Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 1 39 ( n o ti n g that requiring plaintiff to show
employer continued to seek applicants is superior standard to those followed in
? ther c.ou:ts) ; Smith v. F.W. Morse & o., 76 F.3d 4 1 3 , 421 ( 1 st Cir. 1 99 6 ) ( requir1 ? g pla �ntiff to show �e placement continued to perform plaintiff's work after plain
tiff's discharge) ; Mein, 759 F. d at 996 ( requiring plaintiffs to show employer
.
sought replacement for plam t1ff) ; Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d

<:

�

?

1072, 1075 ( t� Cir. 1 986) ( requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replace
ment for plamuff) .

defendants

to

tennination. 1 7 1
V.
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IMPACT OF FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN BROWN

V.

Brown 's

McLE.·\N

Although the Fourth Circuit treated Brown 's discriminatory disc harge
claim as a minor and i nsignificant contention, the court created

a

prece

dent for its application in subsequent discriminatory discharge cases. 1 7'2
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, however, is vastly i nconsistent with
recent federal decisions. 1 73 In fact, the Fourth Circuit is the only federal
circuit court of appeals to adopt a strict approach, which automatically
precludes a plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of discrimin atory
discharge if the plaintiff fails to show non-class replacement. 1 74 The result
is an unequal and inconsistent application of Title VII among fed e ral cir
cuit courts. 1 75

This inconsistency will hopefully prompt the Supreme

Court to clarify the proper elements of the discriminatory discharge prima
facie case . 1 76
Furthermore, by adopting a strict view of the fourth element of the

McDonnell Douglas framework, the Fourth Circuit may be precluding plain
tiffs who have meritorious claims from obtaining a just result. 1 77 Many
circuits have recognized that an employer may have discriminated against
the plaintiff even though the employer replaced the plaintiff with a mem
ber of the plaintiff's protected class. 1 78 This recognition is consistent with
1 7 1 . See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that simple adaptation of
prima facie elements allows plaintiffs to survive motion for summary judgment and
burden then shifts to defendant) .
172. See, e. g., Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-1 1 65 , 1 999 WL
507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (applying Brown holding to discriminatory
discharge prima facie case) .
173. See, e. g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp., 220 F.3d 1 229 ( 1 0th Cir.
2000) (adopting lenient approach to replacement requirement) ; Perry, 1 99 F.3d at
1 1 38 (same ) ; Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. , Inc., 1 99 F.3d 344, 355 ( 3d Cir. 1 999)
(same).
1 74. See Pivirotto, 1 99 F.3d at 354 n.6 (noting that Fourth Circuit is only fed
eral circuit court of appeals to adopt strict non-class replacement approach ) .

175. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 487 ( no ting confusion for litigants of
.
approaches to prima fade case ) .
varymg
1 76. See, e. g., O' Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7 U . S. 308, 309
(1996) (gran ting certiorari to determine whether ADEA plaintiff must show non
class replacement) ; Chappel, supra note 55, at 2 1 1 - 1 2 (noting split among circuits
?Ver �eplacement requirement in ADE.A cases prior to Supreme Court's decision
m 0 Con:iar) ! see also Cl ck- re man, supra note 6, at 487-88 (noting confusion
�
�
.
ar:io �g circmt:' and w1thm
orcmts over replacement requirement in Title VII dis
cnmmatory discharge cases) .

�

1�9.

F.3d at 1 1 37 (stating that employers may fire women
1 77. See'. e.g., Perry,
who they beheve are femm1sts or fire African-Americans who do not "know their
place") ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1 F.3d at 355 (stating employers may discharge employees who
do not meet employers' stereotypical image) .

1 78. For a di scussion of circuits that recognize that plaintiffs may be dismissed
although they have meritorious claims, see supra notes 1 53-59 and accompanying
text.
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the plain tiffs de mini mis burd e n at the prima fac i e stage. 1 7'' The Fourth
Circui t's approac h , however, raises the bar that plaintiffs m ust overcome
to survive a defendant's motion for s u m mary j udgmen t. 1 Ho In the Fourth
Circuit, and i n courts adoptin g the Fourth Circuit's approach , plain tiffs

who may h ave been discriminated against but who

we re

replaced by

a

member of their p rotected class will be excluded from having their day in
court. 1 8 1 This result contravenes the u nderlying purpose of Title VII-to
protect i n d ividuals from employment d is c rimination . 1 H�

Christina M. Sautter

179. For a discussion of the underlying policies of the prima facie

ca.� e . see

supra notes 1 60-71 and accompanying text.
180. See McGinley, supra note 2 2 , at 229 (stating burden at pri m a facie stage

was intended to be de minimis but courts o f appeals now use prima facie stage to
defeat plain tiffs' claims) .
1 8 1 . Contra Clack-Freeman, supra note 6 , at 49 1 (stating that lenient approach
protects claims with merit from automatic dismissal ) .
1 82. See 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) ( 1 995) ( p rohibiting discrimination i n employ
ment arena which is based on sex, religion, race, color and national origi n ) .

